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NOTES
USE OF THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT TO DETERMINE A
LIABILITY INSURER'S DUTY TO DEFEND
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS
Introduction
Several thorny legal problems beset the liability insurer with respect
to its duty to defend the insured against suits, claims and proceedings
when there is a question of fact as to whether the insurer is obligated to
defend under the terms of the policy. These are particularly difficult
when the insurer's duty to defend turns on an issue of fact which is ma-
terial to the injured party's cause of action against the insured. In such
a case the insurer must elect to defend or not to defend. The wrong
choice may subject the insurer to liability in excess of the policy limits.
An additional complication is added when a conflict of interests exists
between the insured and the insurer. For example, a finding that the in-
sured was drunk at the time of the accident benefits the insurer by reliev-
ing it of liability under the policy while the same finding is unfavorable to
the insured. The insurer may attempt to have its duty to defend resolved
in a declaratory judgment action. However, due tc inherent deficiencies
a declaratory judgment action may not constitute the complete solution.
Through an examination of the present law this note will attempt to
reach a judgment as to the most desirable approach to the legal problems
of a liability insurer with respect to its duty to defend the insured.
I. Insurers Duty to Defend
Nearly all liability insurance policies' contain a number of standard
clauses. Among these are clauses which require certain conduct on the
part of the insured as a condition precedent to the insurer's liability. For
example, the insured may be required to notify the insurer as soon as
practicable of any accident,2 promptly forward any summons or other
1. A liability policy protects the insured against liability although he has not paid
a claim or damages to the injured party. An indemnity policy binds the insurer to in-
demnify the insured only after the insured has paid a final judgment. Brandon v. St.
Paul Mercury Indem. Co., 132 Kan. 68, 294 Pac. 881 (1931) ; Boney v. Central Mut.
Ins. Co., 213 N.C. 470, 196 S.E. 837 (1938).
2. See, e.g., Wehner v. Foster, 331 hich. 113, 49 N.W.2d 87 (1951); Calhoun v.
Western Cas. & Sur. Co., 260 Wis. 34, 49 N.W.2d 911 (1951).
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suit papers to the insurer,' cooperate with the insurer in the investigation,
negotiation, and settlement of the claim, and appear or testify at the trial.'
Another standard clause places on the insurer the duty to defend all claims
against the insured which are within the policy coverage whether such
claims are "groundless, false or fraudulent."'5 Where the insurer is re-
quired to defend, it is also given the right to investigate, negotiate, settle,
and control the defense of any such claims.6
The rule in nearly every state is that the duty of the insurer to de-
fend an action brought against the insured is determined by whether the
allegations in the injured party's complaint constitute a claim within the
policy coverage.' Where the facts alleged in the complaint constitute a
claim within the policy coverage, the insurer must defend even though
the insured is in fact not liable or the allegations are false.' On the other
hand, where the facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a claim
within the policy coverage, the insurer is under no duty to defend, even
though under the true facts the claim is within the policy coverage.' The
3. See, e.g., Campbell v. Continental Cas. Co., 170 F.2d 669 (8th Cir. 1948) ; Miller
v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 50 R.I. 166, 146 Atl. 412 (1929).
4. See, e.g., Hathaway, Cooperation Clauses in Automobile Liability Policies, 26
INS. COUNSEL J. 275 (1959). "The assured shall cooperate with the company and, upon
the company's request, shall attend hearings and trials and shall assist in effecting settle-
ments, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the attendance of witnesses and in the
conduct of suits, and the company shall reimburse the assured for any reasonable ex-
pense, other than loss of earnings, incurred at the company's request."
5. See, e.g., DesChamps, The Obligation of the Insurer to Defend Under Casualty
Insurance Policy Contracts, 26 INS. CouNsEL 3. 580, 582 (1959). "With respect to such
insurance as is afforded by this policy, the company shall (a) defend any suit against the
insured alleging such injury, sickness, disease or destruction and seeking damages on ac-
count thereof even if such suit is groundless, false or fraudulent; but the company may
make such investigation, negotiations, and settlement of any claims or suit as it deems
expedient; . .. and the amount so incurred, except settlements of claims and suits are
payable by the company in addition to the applicable limit of liability of this policy."
6. See note 5 supra. The insurer's duty to defend does not extend to criminal prose-
cutions against the insured. Patterson v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 178 Mich. 288, 144
N.W. 491 (1914).
7. Isenhart v. General Cas. Co. of America, 377 P.2d 26 (Ore. 1962). "In accord-
ance with the weight of authority, we have held that the obligation of the insurer to de-
fend is to be determined by the allegations of the complaint filed against the insured."
See 7A APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcTIcE § 4683 (1962); 5 COUCH, INSURANCE
§ 1175e (1929). The standard defend clause also makes the allegations the test. See
note 5 supra. See generally Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 458 (1956). Where the claim is not
clearly within or outside of the policy coverage, the doubt will be resolved in the insured's
favor. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Continental Cas. Co.
v. Phoenix Constr. Co., 46 Cal. 2d 423, 437, 296 P.2d 801, 809 (1956) (coverage will be
found where "semantically possible").
8. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) ; See 7A APPLEMAN,
INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4683 (1962).
9. Ibid. See Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688
(1960) ; Remmer v. Glens Falls Indem. Co., 140 Cal. App. 2d 84, 295 P.2d 19 (1956) ;
Fessenden School, Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193 N.E. 558
(1935).
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nature of the proof adduced at the trial between the injured party and
the insured, the facts as independently ascertained by the insurer, and the
result of the trial are all immaterial in determining the insurer's duty to
defend."0 Although the facts alleged in the injured party's complaint
are outside the policy coverage, the insurer may be liable for a recovery
based on an amended complaint which brings the claim within the policy
coverage."
The reason most often advanced in support cf the general rule is
that an insurer should not be required to defend where it is not bound
to indemnify should the injured party prevail upon his allegations. If
the rule were otherwise, the insurer would be bound to defend every suit
brought against the insured where the insured merely claimed that the
injury was "actually" covered by the policy.' Furthermore, if the in-
surer were required to defend the insured against allegations constituting
a claim outside the policy coverage, it appears that there would be little
incentive for the insurer to provide a conscientious defense because even
if the injured party should prevail, the insurer woulfd not be liable."2
The injured party may allege facts which are false, so that his
claim falls outside the policy coverage whereas allegation of the true facts
would have shown the claim to be within the policy coverage and would
have compelled the insurer to defend. However, f the insured brings
out the true facts at the trial between himself and the injured party and
the complaint is accordingly amended, the insurer will be obligated to de-
fend from the time of the amendment and will be liable for any judgment
against the insured up to the policy limit.
A few cases have held, contrary to the general rule, that facts which
are known or ascertainable will determine the insurer's duty to defend."
10. George H. Wolff Sons, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Cc., 286 F.2d 862 (7th Cir.
1961) ; Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 261 F.2d 774 (7th Cir. 1958) ; Lee v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1949) ; Rom v. Gephart, 30 Ill. App. 2d
199, 173 N.E.2d 828 (1961).
11. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., supra note 10 at 752-53; United Waste Mfg. Co.
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 85 Misc. 539, 148 N.Y.S. 852 (Sup. Ct. 1914) (dictum).
12. Fessenden School, Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 289 Mass. 124, 193
N.E. 558 (1935) ; The insurer is bound to defend with respect to those claims which, if
proved would be within the coverage of the policy. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v.
Hendrix, 199 F.2d 53 (4th Cir. 1952). See Leonard v. Marylarcd Cas. Co., 158 Kan. 263,
266, 146 P.2d 378, 380 (1944) ; Henderson Lighting & Power Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
153 N.C. 275, 283, 69 S.E. 234, 238 (1910).
13. Compare Park Corp. v. Great Am. Indem. Co., 187 Tenn. 79, 213 S.W.2d 12(1948).
14. Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962) ; American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines Inc., 283 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960) ;
Alburquerque Gravel Products Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co., 282 F.2d 218 (10th
Cir. 1960); Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941);
Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962) (suit by
insured against insurer) ; State ex rel. Inter-State Oil Co. v. Bland, 354 Mo. 622, 190
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In Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt,5 the first in a line of cases
in which the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit departed from the
general rule, the injured party's complaint alleged certain facts which
brought the claim outside the policy coverage. Although the insurer
learned these allegations were false and that the incident was actually
within the policy coverage, it refused to defend unless the insured would
execute a nonwaiver agreement which the insured would not do. The
insured settled the claim and demanded reimbursement from the insurer.
The insurer sought a declaratory judgment that it was neither obligated
to defend nor to reimburse the insured for expenses or the amount of the
settlement. The District Court's ruling favorable to the insured was
eventually affirmed by the Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting, which
held that where the allegations differ from the actual facts which bring
the claim within the policy coverage, and these facts are known to the
insurer, then the insurer is bound to defend. The court was apparently
influenced by a hypothetical case posed by the insured in his brief." The
fallacy of the courts' reasoning lay in the failure to distinguish between
the insurer's duty to defend and its ultimate liability to pay a claim with-
in the policy coverage.
Although the insurer is not obligated to defend a claim outside the
policy coverage, this does not necessarily mean that the insurer is relieved
of all its obligations under the policy. If the insured in Hilderbrandt had,
as stated above, defended the claim rather than settling it, and had proved
the actual facts, the injured party's complaint would have required amend-
ment to conform to the proofs; and any recovery then had would have
been within the policy coverage. The insurer would have been under a
duty to defend from the time of amendment."
In Loftin v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 8 the Georgia Appellate
S.W.2d 227 (1945) ; United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Briscoe, 205 Okla. 618, 239 P.2d
754 (1951).
15. 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941).
16. Id. at 299. "A owns two automobiles, a Ford and a Nash. The Ford is covered
by the policy of the company but the Nash is not. A, while driving the Ford, negligently
injures a third party and this party brings an action for damages alleging that A was
driving the Nash. A notifies the company of the accident, furnishes it a copy of the
petition, and explains to it that the car actually involved in the accident was the Ford
and not the Nash. The company shuts its eyes to the information given to it by A as to
the car actually involved in the accident, relies solely upon the allegations of the peti-
tion, makes no investigation of the facts and circumstances, denies liability and refuses
to defend except upon a nonwaiver which A declines to give. A undertakes the defense
of the action with counsel of his own and negotiates a prudent settlement for a stipu-
lated sum which he pays, and then makes demand upon the company to reimburse him
which it declines to do, taking the position that there is no coverage as reflected by the
allegations of the petition."
17. See note 11 supra.
18. 106 Ga. App. 287, 127 S.E.2d 53 (1962).
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Court departed from the general rule and held, two judges dissenting,
". .. that when the complaint against the insured alleges
untrue facts placing the claim within an exception in the policy,
but the true facts, known or ascertainable to the insurer, are
within coverage, the insurer is obligated to defend .... "19
The majority opinion, relying to a great extent on the same authority as
cited in Hilderbrandt and its progeny, placed a strained interpretation on
the defend clause,"0 confused groundless suits with claims not within the
policy coverage,21 and failed to distinguish between Ihe duty to defend and
the ultimate liability to pay claims within the policy coverage.22
Unfortunately, the general rule can, and occasionally does, place the
insured in a difficult and apparently unjustified predicament. There are
situations in which an incident is actually covered by the policy but the
insurer is under no duty to defend merely because of circumstances en-
tirely within the control of the injured party. Furthermore, the costs of
defending and the probability of bringing out the true facts to show that
the claim is actually within the policy coverage may be such that, in effect,
the policy is of no value to the insured. In both Hilderbrandt and Loftin
the courts were moved by an apparent injustice of the general rule as ap-
plied to the cases before them, and in order to reach a just result, they
deviated from the general rule. That such deviation may be unjust in it-
self is well stated by the dissent in Lof tin, which emphasized the contrac-
tual aspect. The dissent pointed out that the insurance company should
be allowed to stand on its contract. So long as the allegations showed no
19. Id. at 296, 127 S.E.2d at 59.
20. Id. at 293, 127 S.E.2d at 58. The defend clause was identical to that set out at
note 5 supra. The court said: "If the insurer intended otherwise, it could have made its
intent clear and unmistakable by undertaking to defend 'unless the complaint alleges facts
which show the claim to be excluded from coverage,' or by using other unambiguous
language, for example: 'The company shall defend claims an( suits, groundless or other-
wise, for which it may become liable only when the allegations thereof show injury,
covered by the policy and do not show the claim to be excluded by the policy.'
21. Id. at 297, 127 S.E.2d at 60. "In many cases, where the facts alleged in the
complaint and the true facts are not in conflict, and where the complaint falsely alleges
facts within coverage, but the insurer, with the duty to dcfend groundless suits, has
knowledge of the true facts not within coverage, a correct result has been reached by
holding that the allegations of the complaint determine the duty to defend .... These
cases are compatible with this decision."
22. Id. at 294, 127 S.E.2d at 58. "The true rule is that .he duty to defend is deter-
mined by the contract; and since the contract obligates the insurer to defend claims as-
serting liability under the policy, even if groundless, the allepations of the complaint are
looked at to determine whether a liability covered by the policy is asserted. Therefore,
to speak of the allegations of the complaint as the standard determining the duty to
defend is confusing. In any event, that so-called 'rule' has no proper application when
the incident causing injury is covered by the policy, but the complaint against the insured
falsely shows noncoverage."
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coverage, the company should have no duty to have them changed. The
insured would not be breaking faith with the company by informing the
plaintiff of its error in naming a car not covered when the accident really
involved another car of the insured which was covered. In pointing out
that a different car was involved in the accident, the insured could still
deny liability and fulfill his agreement to cooperate with the company.
II. Courses of Action Open to the Insurer
When the allegations lie outside the contract coverage and a satis-
factory settlement is not reached, or for some reason the injured party
files suit, the insurer must choose from the courses of action open to it.
The insurer may (1) defend without reservation, (2) defend under a
nonwaiver agreement or a reservation of rights, (3) disclaim liability
and refuse to defend, or, (4) in combination with any of the above,
bring a declaratory judgment action to determine whether it is bound to
defend.
A. Defend Without Reservation. Where the insurer feels that the
injured party's claim is dearly within the policy coverage and that the
insured has fulfilled all the conditions precedent, the insurer may defend
the insured without reservation. However, even in the seemingly clear-
cut case, defending without reservation may present serious problems to
the insurer. If the insurer, with knowledge of facts which take the case
outside the policy coverage and without disclaiming liability or entering
into a nonwaiver agreement23 with the insured, assumes the defense of
the action against the insured, the insurer may thereafter be precluded
from setting up the defense of noncoverage" in an action on the policy.
In addition to losing the defense of noncoverage, by defending the in-
sured the insurer may lose the policy defenses that the insured failed to
cooperate, that the insured failed to forward suit papers promptly, or
that the insured failed to furnish notice and proof of loss. 2  However,
23. In this note, a distinction is made between a nonwaiver agreement and a reserva-
tion of rights. A nonwaiver agreement is a contract entered into between the insurer
and the insured. It gives the insurer the right to defend any action brought against the
insured without giving up the right to assert its policy defenses as to liability. A reser-
vation of rights is merely notice given by the insurer to the insured that the insurer will
defend the insured, but in doing so does not waive its policy defenses.
24. Schmidt v. National Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 207 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1953) (in-
surer took up defense of claim after its offer to defend without waiver was refused;
taking up defense with knowledge of all facts estopped insurer to deny coverage) ; State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 104 Ga. App. 815, 123 S.E.2d 191 (1961) (insurer
gave timely notice to insured which was suficient to fairly inform insured of insurer's
position and therefore preserve the insurer's policy defenses) ; Utilities Ins. Co. v. Mont-
gomery, 134 Tex. 640, 138 S.W.2d 1062 (1940) (nonwaiver agreement preserved in-
surer's defense that claim was not within policy coverage).
25. See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Beckwith, 74 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1935) (waived
defense of non-cooperation) ; Simons v. Cowan, 217 Minn. 317, 14 N.W.2d 356 (1944)
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where the tort complaint alleges several grounds, some within and some
outside the policy coverage, it has been held that the insurer's defense of
the action on all grounds will not estop the insurer from asserting the
defense of noncoverage if recovery is had on a groumd outside the policy
coverage.26
Some cases require prejudice to the insured before the insurer's con-
duct of the insured's defense can operate as an estoppel. Where the
insurer does not discover the noncooperation of the insured until shortly
before28 or even during" the trial of the tort action-for example, if the
insured fails to appear as he is required to do under the policy-it has
been held that the insurer must immediately withdraw from the defense
and disclaim liability in order to avoid waiver or estoppel precluding it
from later raising the defense of the insured's noncooperation in an ac-
tion on the policy."
B. Defend Under Reservatioi;. In practically all cases, especially
those in which the insurer is in doubt as to the coverage of the policy or
whether the insured has failed to perform a condition, the insurer will
want to protect itself from the possibility that some conduct on its part
will later be held to preclude it from asserting its policy defenses. The
general rule is that the insurer's conduct of the insured's defense in the
tort suit will not be held to waive the insurer's policy defenses or estop
it from asserting them where the insurer has given the insured timely
notice 1 which fairly informs the insured of the insurer's position.2 Fur-
(waived defense of non-cooperation) ; General Fin. Co. v. Pernsylvania Threshermen &
Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 348 Pa. 358, 35 A.2d 409 (1944) (waived right to require
notice of accident in writing). For typical notice and proof of loss clause, see Lomont
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 128 Ind. App. 645, 650, 151 N.E.2d 701, 703 (1958).
26. See, e.g., Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Miers, 217 Ind. 400, 27 N.E.2d 342 (1940) ; Put-
nam v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., Ltd., 90 N.H. 74, 4 A.2d 353 (1939).
27. Kearns Coal Corp. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 118 F.2d 33 (2d Cir.
1941) ccrt. denied, 313 U.S. 579 (1941) ; Fitzgerald v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 226
Wis. 520, 277 N.W. 183 (1938). But this requirement is eff-ctively nullified in many
courts by holdings that prejudice is conclusively presumed or is an inevitable effect of
the insured's loss of his right to maintain control of the defease. Schmidt v. National
Auto. & Cas. Ins. Co., 207 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1953) ; Merchant3 Indem. Corp. v. Eggles-
ton, 37 N.J. 114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962).
28. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Goldwasser, 7 App. Div. 2d 849, 181 N.Y.S.2d
439 (1959) ; Kurz v. Collins, 6 Wis. 2d 538, 95 N.W.2d 365 (1959).
29. DeHart v. Illinois Cas. Co., 116 F.2d 685 (7th Cir. 1940) (insurer waived
breach of co-operation clause). But where the trial court refuses permission for the
insurer to withdraw, continuation of the defense will not constitute a waiver. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Sharpton, 259 Ala. 386, 66 So. 2d 915 (1953); Curry v. Napoli-
tano, 381 Pa. 37, 112 A.2d 82 (1955).
30. Goldstein v. Bernstein, 315 Mass. 329, 52 N.E.2d 559 (1943); Bauman v. West-
ern & So. Indem. Co., 230 Mo. App. 835, 77 S.W.2d 496 (1934).
31. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 104 Ga. App. 815, 123 S.E.2d 191
(1961) (where, after commencement of tort action against insured, insurer learned that
insured had made misrepresentations in obtaining the policy and gave notice of reser-
vation of rights the following day, the notice was timely).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
thermore, the insured generally need not consent to the insurer's reserva-
tion of rights in order that the reservation be effective, but some courts
have required the insured's consent to the reservation.3 The courts which
require consent seem to be saying that the insurer must enter into a non-
waiver agreement with the insured to protect its policy defenses.3 4
C. Disclaim Liability and Refuse to Defend. If the insurer believes
that the claim is outside the policy coverage or that the insured has failed
to perform a condition precedent to the insurer's liability, the insurer may
refuse to defend the insured in the tort action and disclaim any liability
under the policy. The legal effects of the refusal depend upon whether
the claim is actually within or outside the policy coverage. If the claim
is within the policy coverage, the insurer may be in breach of its contract
to defend the insured. In this case, the insurer is liable to the insured for
all damages resulting from the breach." Damages include not only any
judgment against the insured up to the policy limit, 6 but also court costs,
attorneys' fees, and other costs growing out of the litigation.3" Where
the insured successfully defends the tort suit, the insurer is still liable for
the insured's court costs, attorneys' fees, etc., to the extent that the in-
sured does not get judgment and satisfaction from the tort plaintiff."
32. The sufficiency is to be determined by the facts of the particular case. Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gentry, 202 Va. 338, 117 S.E.2d 76 (1960).
33. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash. 2d 679, 99 P.2d 420 (1940);
United States Guarantee Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 244 Wis. 317, 12 N.W.2d 59
(1943); Annot., 81 A.L.R. 1326, 1383 (1932); 7A APPLEMAN, INsuRANcE LAW & PRAc-
TICE § 4694 (1962).
34. See note 23 supra. However, there may not be a great practical difference be-
tween the two views because consent may be inferred from the insured's failure to reject
the insurer's offer to defend under reservation where the insured is fairly informed that
the offer may be accepted or rejected. Merchants Indem. Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 N.J.
114, 179 A.2d 505 (1962).
For a discussion of the non-waiver agreement, see Sadownik, The Non-Waiver
Agreement, 6 CAN. B.J. 354 (1963).
35. Equity Mut. Ins. Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688 (1960) ;
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Transit Co., 190 Miss. 560, 1 So. 2d 221 (1941) ;
An honest mistake by the insurer is no defense to an unjustified refusal. Comunale v.
Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) ; Fontenot v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 119 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1960).
36. Mannheimer Bros. v. Kansas Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Minn. 482, 184 N.WN. 189
(1921). But where the insurer fails to make a reasonable settlement within the policy
limits and also refuses to defend, it may be held liable for the full amount of the judg-
ment against the insured even though the judgment exceeds the policy limits. Comunale
v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
37. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958)
(court costs) ; O'Morro v. Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946) (attorney's fees) ;
Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Transit Co., 190 Miss. 560, 1 So. 2d 221 (1941)
(costs incurred by insured in investigation) ; Kaste v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 5
App. Div. 2d 203, 170 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1958) (appeal bond); Murphy v. Hopkins, 68 S.D.
494, 4 N.W.2d 801 (1942) (witness and stenographer fees).
38. Lee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 178 F.2d 750 (2d Cir .1949) ; Equity Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 232 Ark. 41, 334 S.W.2d 688 (1960) ; Fontenot v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 119 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 1960).
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The only limitation seems to be that the attorneys' fees and other costs
must be reasonable. 9 In addition to the insurer's increased liability
stemming from the breach of contract," whenever the insurer disclaims
liability it loses several advantages which it enjoyed under the policy. Be-
sides losing the right to control the litigation,4" the insurer also loses the
right to insist that the insured comply with the affirmative clauses of the
policy, 2 such as the cooperation clause, and the prohibitory clauses of the
policy, 3 such as the clause which prohibits the insured from making any
personal settlements with the injured party without the consent of the
insurer.4'
Obviously, the insurer faces a problem when it must decide which
course of action to take. If it disclaims liability and refuses to defend, it
does so at its peril. Whether the insured successfully defends his suit or
not, he may sue the insurer to recover on the insurer's allegedly unjusti-
fied refusal to defend. When this happens, the insurer still has a suit to
defend; but instead of defending in the name of the insured, the insurer
is defending in its own name.4 On the other hand, if the insurer elects
to defend the insured, it may still lose its policy defenses if it does not
obtain a valid nonwaiver agreement or properly reserve its rights.
D. Seek a Declaratory Judgment. The insurer's duty to defend
the insured against actions by injured persons is frequently sought to be
determined in a declaratory judgment action4" so fhat the insurer may
39. London Guarantee & Acc. Co. v. Shafer, 35 F. Supp. 647 (D.C. Ohio 1940);
Carolina Veneer & Lumber Co. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Cc., 202 S.C. 103, 24 S.E.2d
153 (1943).
40. Farmers' Ins. Exch. v. Henderson, 82 Ariz. 335, 31.3 P.2d 404 (1957) (loss
suffered from sale of business on execution); Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers'
Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 181 Md. 295, 29 A.2d 653 (1943) (loss due to sale of
property at sheriff's sale).
41. St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173
(1906) ; Southern Sur. Co. v. Columbian Ins. Co., 78 Ind. App. 179, 133 N.E. 611 (1922) ;
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Buckeye Union Cas. Co., 157 Ohio St. 358, 105 N.E.2d 568
(1952).
42. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Castle, Rober & fathe- ,s, 48 F.2d 523 (8th Cir.
1931) cert. denied, 284 U.S. 624 (1931) (file proof of loss) ; Coulter v. American Em-
ployers' Ins. Co., 333 Ill. App. 631, 78 N.E.2d 131 (1948) (give notice and forward suit
papers) ; Conrad v. Duffin, 158 Pa. Super. 305, 44 A.2d 770 (1945) (cooperation).
43. St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173
(1906) (insured's obligation not to settle) ; Nixon v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 225 N.C.
106, 120 S.E.2d 430 (1961) (insured's obligation not to agree to a consent judgment).
44. St. Louis Dressed Beef & Provision Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 201 U.S. 173
(1906) ; See Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 694 (1956). Cf. Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.,
50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958) ; Commercial Cas. Ins. Co. v. Tri-State Transit Co.,
190 Miss. 560, 1 So. 2d 221 (1941).
45. It is widely recognized in the insurance business that a "jury bias" exists. That is,juries are more likely to find against an insurance company an6 to return larger verdicts
than would be the case with an individual defendant, even though the individual were
insured.
46. Declaratory judgment actions are provided for by the Federal Declaratory
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know in advance whether it must defend the insured. Such a determina-
tion in advance of trial of the tort suit relieves the insurer of making an
election at its peril and may be of some benefit to the injured party since
he will be concerned about the possibility that the proceeds of the policy
will be available as an asset of the insured.
An action for a declaratory judgment must present a "justiciable
controversy," which the courts define in broad enough terms to allow
themselves considerable latitude in finding its existence.48 The general
rule does not require that actual damages be accrued or that an irrevers-
ible change of position have been made. But, the plaintiff's danger must
be present, not contingent on some future happening, and the threat must
be actual and genuine, not merely possible or remote.49 Usually the courts
give a liberal construction to the rule and find a justiciable controversy
where they feel that by so doing justice will be served."0
The courts uniformly hold that the power to grant declaratory relief
is discretionary. Discretion is expressly granted to the court in the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act,51 and although there is no such
express grant in the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, the federal
courts have recognized that their power to grant declaratory relief is
discretionary. 2 The court may properly refuse declaratory relief where
Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1959), and by the statutes of every state except
Mississippi and Oklahoma. Welsh, Reservations of Right and Declaratory Judgments,
INs. L.J. 655, 660 (1954). The majority of the states have adopted, with or without
reservation, the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act.
47. In most cases, if the insurer is under a duty to defend, it will also be ultimately
liable for a judgment against the insured. But there is no legal requirement that this be
so. The insured may, even at the eleventh hour of trial, fail to cooperate with the in-
surer and thereby relieve the insurer of its liability.
48. "A justiciable controversy is . . . distinguished from a difference or dispute
of a hypothetical or abstract character; from one that is academic or moot. [Citation
omitted.] The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests. [Citation omitted.] It must be a real and sub-
stantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive charac-
ter, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts. [Citations omitted.]" Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-
41 (1937). See Porland Web Pressmen's Union, Local No. 17 v. Oregonian Publishing
Co., 188 F. Supp. 859 (D.C. Ore. 1960), aff'd 286 F.2d 4 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 912 (1960).
49. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 29 Ill. App. 2d 451, 173 N.E.2d 590
(1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 878 (1961) ; Maryland Cas. Co. v. United Corp. of Massa-
chusetts, 29 F. Supp. 986 (D.C. Mo. 1939), revld, 111 F.2d 443 (1st Cir. 1940) ; Wolver-
ine Mut. Motor Ins. Co. v. Clark, 277 Mich. 633, 270 N.W. 167 (1937). See BORCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 33-62 (2d ed. 1941).
50. 20 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 11353 (1963).
51. The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where
such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy giving rise to the proceeding. UNIFoRm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 6.
52. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Quarles, 92 F.2d 321 (4th Cir. 1937).
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another action is pending between the parties which will determine the
rights of the parties,"5 but the mere pendency of another action wherein
all the rights of the parties will not be determined does not require the
refusal of a declaratory judgment. 4
In federal courts the existence of another adequate remedy does not
in itself preclude the granting of a declaratory judgment. 5 However,
use of declaratory judgments for forum shopping or as a procedural de-
lay is not tolerated." The state decisions on the other hand are split,
some of them refusing, despite express wording to the contrary in the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, 7 to grant declaratory relief where
another adequate remedy is available.5" This appears to be contrary to
the express purpose of declaratory judgments-to have a controversy de-
termined by a court in advance of any invasion of rights and to dispose
of uncertain or disputed obligations quickly and conclusively. 9
Soon after the adoption of the Federal Declaratory Judgments Act
in 1934, several lower federal courts took the position that a declaration
of nonliability was not a declaration of "rights" within the meaning of
the Act," but since the case of Aetna Life Ius. Co. v. Haworth,6 it has
become well established that an insurer's immunity from liability under
53. Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942) ; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Yeatts, 99 F.2d 665 (4th Cir. 1938); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Quarles, 92 F.2d 321
(4th Cir. 1937) (after judgment in the tort suit, the insured brought an action against
the insurer in the state court; declaratory judgment refused b tcause the rights of the
parties would or could be determined in the pending state action .
54. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Ryan, 109 F.2d 690 (6th Cir. 1940), petitions
for ecrt. dismissed, 311 U.S. 722 (1940).
55. ". . . The existence of another adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment
for declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate. . . ." FED. R. CIv. P. 57. But the
declaratory judgment will not be used to pre-empt and prejud,e issues committed for
initial decision to an administrative body or special tribunal, Public Serv. Comm. of Utah
v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952), or where an exclusive sttutory remedy is avail-
able, Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Land, 151 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1945), rev'd sub. nom., Ma-
cauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540 (1946).
56. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Boyle Constr. Co., Inc., 123 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1941);
American Auto. Ins. Co. v. Freundt, 103 F.2d 613 (7th Cir. 193S).
57. "Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have the power to
declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could
be claimed." UNIFORm DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS Act § 1.
58. Allegheny County v. Equitable Gas Co., 321 Pa. 127, 18S Atl. 916 (1936) ; Caro-
line Street Permanent Bldg. Ass'n v. Sohm, 178 Md. 434, 13 A.2d 616 (1940) (where
"one of the common remedies of law or equity is adequate and available a proceeding for
a declaratory judgment is not appropriate. .. ").
59. Pinkard v. Mendel, 216 Ga. 487, 117 S.E.2d 336 (1960); Langer v. State, 69
N.D. 129, 284 N.W. 238 (1939) ; Ohio Farmers Indem. Co. v. Chames, 170 Ohio St. 209,
163 N.E.2d 367 (1959) ; see generally BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 317-37 (2d
ed. 1941).
60. See, e.g., Columbian Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Foulke, 13 F. Supp. 350 (W.D. Mo.
1936), re,'d, 89 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1937).
61. 300 U.S. 227 (1937), reversing 84 F.2d 695 (8th Cir. 1936), affirming 11 F.
Supp. 1016 (W.D. Mo. 1935); rehearing denied, 300 U.S. 687 (1937).
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a contract of insurance is a proper subject for declaratory relief.2
In most cases, the factual issues which are determinative of the in-
surer's duty to defend are separable from the issues which are determina-
tive of the insured's tort liability to the injured party. Standing alone,
however, the declaratory judgment may not be a complete solution to the
insurer's problem because the insurer usually must take certain steps, such
as investigation of the injured party's claim, while the declaratory judg-
ment action is pending; and such conduct on the part of the insurer may
be held, in the absence of a nonwaiver agreement, to waive its policy
defenses or estop it to assert them.63
Generally, where the tort complaint alleges only one cause of action
which the insurer feels is outside the policy coverage, and the issues
which are determinative of the insurer's duty to defend are separable
from the issues which are determinative of the insured's tort liability to
the injured party, the declaratory judgment and a nonwaiver agreement
completely solve the insurer's problem. If the insurer prevails, it has no
duty to defend the insured, and its policy defenses are preserved. If the
insured prevails, the insurer is obligated to defend and, if the defense is
unsuccessful, will be liable for any judgment against the insured up to
the policy limit. More important, perhaps, the interests of the insurer
and the insured are fully aligned.6 4
Where the issues which determine policy coverage cannot be sepa-
rated from the issues which determine the insured's tort liability, addi-
tional problems arise. Since the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel are operative only between parties to the prior action, the find-
ings of fact in the declaratory judgment action would have no effect in
the tort action unless both the insured and the injured party were parties
to the declaratory judgment action. Most states have held that the in-
jured party is not a proper party in an action between the insurer and the
insured to determine policy coverage. A recent example is Utah Farm
Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg,66 where the injured party sued the insured for
damages arising out of an automobile accident, allegedly due to the in-
sured's intoxication.
62. The wording of the Uniform Act is "rights, status, and other legal relations."
UNIFORmt DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS ACT § 12. The Federal act refers to "rights and
other legal relations." Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1959).
63. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Young, 18 F. Supp. 450 (D.D.C. 1937).
64. "Fully alligned" does not imply that there will be a complete absence of hard
feelings between the insured and the insurer but rather that it is in the best interests of
both to cooperate and put forth the best possible defense; the insurer because it will be
liable in the event of a judgment against the insured and the insured because he is still
subject to the cooperation clause and may lose the benefits of the policy if he breaches it.
65. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942).
66. 6 Utah 2d 399, 315 P.2d 277 (1957).
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The insurance policy contained a clause which suspended all coverage
when the automobile was driven by a driver who was "under the influ-
ence of alcohol." The insured had entered a plea of guilty to a charge of
drunken driving. The insurer refused to defend the insured and before
trial of the tort action brought an action for declaratory judgment against
the insured and the injured party in order to have its duties under the
policy determined. The majority of the court stated that
". .. Had [the injured party] objected to his joinder in
this action, which he did not do, nor did he appear in this court
to voice such objection, it would have been error to have com-
pelled his joinder even under a most liberal view of Rule 20,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and we want to repel any in-
ference which may be drawn from this opinion that one who
claims to be damaged by the negligent act of another, is a
proper party to an action by the insurer of the latter under a
public liability policy, whereby a declaratory judgment is sought
declaring the legal effect of the terms of such policy."67
The court went on to say that the question of policy coverage could be
decided without reference to any liability having accrued under the policy.
This being so
". .. there is no issue of law or fact in common between
the insurer and the plaintiff, or potential plaintiff, to a tort
action against the insured. . . . To drag him into the declara-
tory judgment action is to import into it a totally different
controversy, and then assert that there are issues of law or fact
in common. Indeed, if such tort victim is a proper party to the
present action, then it would appear that the insurance company,
and other companies similarly situated, is a proper party to a
tort action against the insured-a proposition Nx hich, it is safe
to assume, such companies would not espouse. ' '
By contrast, under the Uniform Declaratory J adgments Act, Sec-
tion 11, ' it has been held that in declaratory judgment proceedings in-
67. Id. at 406, 315 P.2d at 281.
6S. Ibid.
69. "When declaratory relief is sought, all persons shall be made parties who have
or claim any interest which would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall
prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any proceeding which
involves the validity of a municipal ordinance or franchise, such municipality shall be
made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if the statutc, ordinance or franchise
is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney-General of the State shall also be served
with a copy of the proceeding and be entitled to be heard." Uznmnar DEcLRATORY Juno-
MENTS Act § 11.
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volving the construction of an insurance policy, all persons whose in-
terests would be affected by the declaratory judgment should be joined,
and if they are not, the action would be dismissed." The stated purposes
of joinder in these cases are to render the declaratory judgment res
judicata to the injured party, and, to make the declaratory judgment
binding upon all the interested parties and thus terminating the con-
troversy."'
It should be noted that the court in Ckugg relied on Rule 20, Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure," rather than on the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act, Section 11, which is also in force in Utah. 3 In apply-
ing Rule 20, the court categorically stated that the insurance contract
could be construed "without reference to any liability having accrued
thereunder" and reasoned from this premise to the conclusion that there
was no issue of law or fact in common between the insurer and the in-
jured party. It is submitted that in Chugg there was an issue of fact in
common between the insurer and the injured party, and although the court
felt it was insufficient ground for the purpose of making the injured
party a party to the declaratory judgment action between the insurer and
the insured, it should not have been ignored by the court in construing
the policy.
The factual issue of the insured's intoxication was determinative of
both the insured's tort liability and the policy coverage. If the insured
was in fact intoxicated, then the policy coverage was suspended, the in-
surer was under no duty to defend, and because intoxication supports the
allegation of negligence, the insured was liable to the injured party for
damages arising out of the accident. On the other hand, if the insured
was in fact not intoxicated, the policy coverage was not suspended and the
insurer was under a duty to defend; moreover, the insured may have
been negligent notwithstanding the fact that he was not intoxicated and
therefore still be liable to the injured party for damages arising out of
the accident.
Where the factual issues which determine the insured's tort liability
are the same issues upon which the insurer bases its claim of noncoverage,
it may be desirable to have those factual issues resolved once and for all
70. "Persons who have been injured in an automobile accident are certainly proper
parties to a suit by the liability insurer to determine the coverage of its policy, and the
better rule would seem to be that they are both proper and necessary parties to the main-
tenance of the suit." 20 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRAcTIcE 166-68 (1963) (see
cases cited).
71. Continental Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cochrane, 89 Colo. 462, 4 P.2d 308 (1931) ; Updike
Invest. Co. v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 128 Neb. 295, 258 N.W. 470 (1935).
72. Rule 20(a) is essentially the same as FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a).
73. 9 UTAHr CODE ANNOT. § 78-33-11 (1953).
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between all the parties concerned. A determination of the issue in the
declaratory judgment action between the insurer and the insured, where
the injured party is not a party to that action, would have no binding ef-
fect in a tort action between the injured party and the insured. One
solution to this problem is to require the joinder of the injured party in
the declaratory judgment action, as some courts have done under the
Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, Section 11, so that the determina-
tion of the issue there would be res judicata between the injured party
and the insured. ' However, it is not suggested that the injured party be
made a necessary party to every declaratory judgment action between the
insurer and the insured. On the contrary, in the great majority of cases,
the factual issues will be separable, there will be no issue of fact in com-
mon between the insurer and the injured party, and therefore, the in-
jured party would not be a proper party to the action. To require the
injured party's joinder in these cases would be tantamount to a direct
action statute.
Joinder should be limited to those cases where the factual issues are
not separable, but even then there is a strong argument against the in-
jured party's joinder. Requiring the injured party to appear in the
declaratory judgment action between the insurer and the insured may de-
prive the injured party of his choice of forum and time for bringing
suit. Furthermore, he would appear as a defendart rather than as a
plaintiff, which may alter the burdens of proof and going forward with
evidence. For these reasons, it is submitted that the issue should not be
tried in the declaratory judgment action.
The question remains, whether it is proper to grant the insurer a
declaratory judgment to determine its duty to defend, or whether the
correct view is expressed in an Illinois case," which held that the insurer's
duty to defend
". .. is primarily at this point a business judgment policy
problem inherent in the nature of its business and in the lan-
guage of its own policy, which the Court is not required in this
1176declaratory judgment suit to solve ... .
thereby forcing the insurer to make an election at its pteril. In Chugg, the
majority of the court felt that this was a proper action for declaratory
74. See note 70 supra and accompanying text. Langlie v. United Fireman's Ins. Co.,
40 F. Supp. 24 (W.D. Wash. 1941) ; American Auto. Ins. Co. v. English, 266 Ala. 80, 94
So. 2d 397 (1957) ; Royal Indem. Co. v. Hartford Ace. & Indern. Co., 58 N.J. Super.
75, 155 A.2d 270 (1959).
75. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Morris, 29 IIl. App. 2d 451, 173 N.E.2d 590,
(1961), cert. doded, 368 U.S. 878 (1961).
76. Id. at 469, 173 N.E.2d at 599.
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judgment and stated that, despite the fact that the declaratory judgment
action was brought to determine the validity of the policy and its provi-
sions both in relation to the insured and the injured party, the court was
not precluded from deciding the issue of the insured's intoxication at the
time of the accident and granting the insurer the affirmative relief (that
is, nonliability under the insurance contract) it asked for in its com-
plaint. But a strong dissent contended that the suit represented a col-
lateral suit having the effect of holding up a pending suit, to determine
facts which are issuable in the pending suit. Also, the dissent protested
that an insurer could use the action as a "writ of prohibition" by
[taking] advantage of crowded court calendars, to
be followed by an appeal, while the witnesses and evidence in
the stalemated pending action disappear, the [insurer] becoming
the beneficiary of such disappearance by relieving itself not
only of its liability, but its specific covenant to defend the
[insured] .""
He also argued that if both the tort suit and the declaratory judgment
action were allowed to proceed simultaneously, as the majority indicated
that they should be, the insurer would be ". . talking out of both sides
of its mouth by attempting to prove, under its duty to defend in the one
action, that its [insured] was not intoxicated, while in the other action
and at the same time, it would be attempting to prove that its [insured]
was intoxicated. 78 On this line of reasoning-that the tort action should
not be allowed to proceed simultaneously with the declaratory judgment
action, nor should the tort action be delayed-the dissent reached the con-
clusion that the action was not a proper one for declaratory judgment. If
the insurer was not allowed the declaratory judgment to determine its
duty to defend under the policy, the insurer
". .. would have to defend and attempt to show its as-
sured was not intoxicated, the proving of which would elimi-
nate the insurance company's liability to the person allegedly
injured by its assured. If it did so defend and it was established
that the assured was drunk, the insurance company likewise
would be absolved from liability under the provisions of the
policy, so that by carrying out its solemn promise to defend all
actions brought against the assured, groundless or not, it would
lose but little and would have relieved its assured from any ex-
77. Utah Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Chugg, 6 Utah 2d 399, 407, 315 F.2d 277, 282
(1957).
78. Ibid.
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pense of defending himself, which the company represented it
would do when it accepted the premium.""
The dissent felt that the declaratory judgment action was not proper.
The majority, on the other hand, felt that not only was the action proper,
but that it was also proper to decide the issue of the insured's intoxica-
tion. It is submitted that the declaratory judgment action was proper in
Chugg, but that the issue of the insured's intoxication should not have
been decided.
This line of reasoning was followed in Stout v, Grain Dealers Mut.
Ins. Co.,"0 where the insured shot and killed a "peeping Tom" and was in-
dicted for murder. On trial, he was allowed to plead guilty to man-
slaughter and he received a fine and suspended sentence. The adminis-
tratrix of the "peeping Tom" instituted a wrongful death action against
the insured, alleging both intentional and negligent conduct. The in-
surer refused to defend on the ground that death was intentionally in-
flicted and was therefore outside the policy coveragfe. The insured then
sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer was liable under the
policy to defend him in the wrongful death action. The District Court
entered judgment for the insurer and on appeal the Circuit Court af-
firmed. The Circuit Court stated:
". . The insurer could not defend the insured in the
wrongful death suit and urge that the death was not intentional
while at the same time contend that there is no coverage under
the policy because death was inflicted intentionally by the in-
sured. There would be a conflict of interests on1 the part of the
insurer that would be impossible to resolve if it was forced to
defend the insured."'"
In both Ch ugg and Stout the insurer was faced with a conflict of interests.
The court in Chnugg apparently failed to recognize that the conflict of in-
terests existed, and felt that the insurer should be required to defend,
while the court held in Stout that the insurer could not defend.
In another federal court case, Harbin v. Assurace Co. of America, 2
79. Ibid. It seems that the dissent has equated intoxication with negligence and no
intoxication with no negligence. Although the former may be true, it is submitted that
the latter does not follow.
80. 307 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1962).
81. Id. at 524.
82. 30S F.2d 748 (10th Cir. 1962). Had the court followed the general rule that the
insurer's duty to defend is determined solely by the terms of the policy and the allegations
of the tort complaint, the conflict of interests issue would not hive arisen here. In three
earlier cases, Hardware Mlut. Cas. Co. v. Hilderbrandt, 119 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1941),
Alberquerque Gravel Products Co. v. American Employers Ins. Co. 282 F.2d 218 (10th
Cir. 1960), and American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 283
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the facts were similar to both Chugg and Stout. The tort action was filed
in the state court by the injured party against the insured. The tort com-
plaint alleged only intentional conduct on the part of the insured. The
insured had been convicted of criminal assault on charges arising out of
the same incident.8" The insured's answer to the tort complaint denied
the allegations and raised the defense of self-defense. The insurer then
sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District Court that it
was under no duty to defend the insured because the claim was beyond
the coverage of the policy, which specifically excluded injury "caused
intentionally by or at the direction of the insured." The insured then
filed a third party claim against the insurer in the state court action, as-
serting policy coverage. On motion of the insured, the injured party was
joined as a party defendant in the federal action. The District Court
granted summary judgment for the insurer and the insured appealed. The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment with the
modification that the insurer was "not obligated at this time"8 4 to defend
the insured in the state court action, and declared that the judgment
entered was "not determinative of the insurer's liability under the policy
in the event the facts as established are that the injuries asserted by [the
injured party] come within policy coverage." 5
The court made it clear that if judgment should be rendered against
the insured in the state court action on a set of facts within the policy
coverage, the insurer would be liable for that judgment under the policy,
which must be taken to mean that the insurer would be liable only up to
the policy limit. However, the question of whether the insurer would
also be required to assume all costs of defense remained open."8
Harbin has been criticized for applying the conflict of interests rule
because
"if the insurer were to exculpate itself by showing that the
conduct of the insured was intentional, in reliance upon the
F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1960), the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had held that the
"established facts" would control. However, what constitutes an "established fact" is not
clear. See Comment, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 185 (1963).
83. In each of the cases considered, Chugg, Stout, and Harbin, there was a criminal
conviction or plea of guilty to a crime before the declaratory judgment action was com-
menced. In Chugg, the criminal record was held inadmissible. In Stout, it was appar-
ently admitted without question. It was admitted in Harbin because the Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit had held in previous cases (see note 82, sapra) that the court would
go beyond the tort complaint and look at established facts. Whether the criminal record
should be admitted and what effect it is to be given are questions which must be decided
by each court on the basis of statute and case law.
84. Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1962).
85. Ibid.
86. See Comment, 3 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 185, 188 n. 17 (1963).
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previous adjudication (i.e., the criminal trial), there would be
no possibility of exposing the insured to greater liability than
was sought in the complaint. The 'conflict cf interests' rule
therefore, should not have applied to the facts in Harbin.
The rule of conflict to interests would only become im-
portant if the complaint was amended to include negligence."8
This criticism of Harbin seems to be too limited in that it recognizes a
conflict of interests only where the insured could be subjected to "greater
liability" than is sought in the complaint. In Farm Bureau Mut. Auto.
I s. Co. v. Haminer," which the Harbin court cited by footnote,"9 the
conflict of interests rule was not so narrowly stated. There, the court,
quoting Freeman on Judgments, said, "A third party cannot be called
upon to defend an action where his showing himself not to be liable will
not necessarily result in a judgment in favor of the party asking him to
defend.""0
Applied to Harbin, this statement of the rule would prevent the in-
surer from defending the insured because the showing by the insurer that
it was not liable under the policy (because the insured's conduct was in-
tentional) would "not necessarily result" in a judgment in favor of the
insured; in fact, such a showing by the insurer corld not possibly result
in a judgment in favor of the insured because the injured party's cause
of action was based on the same issue. It may be argued that this state-
ment of the conflict of interests rule obligates the insurer to defend in
fewer instances than a narrower statement of the rule, and that this result
is undesirable because the insurer's conduct of the defense is generally of
great value to the insured." Nevertheless, the insured would probably
obtain a better defense from counsel whose interest3 lie entirely with the
insured than he would from the insurer's counsel whose interests are
divided. No matter how worthy a man's motives may be, the old axiom
that a man cannot faithfully serve two masters is 3till valid.
Conclusion
The general rule that the insurer's duty to defend is determined
solely by the terms of the policy and the allegations of the tort complaint
87. Id. at 191.
88. 117 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, Beverage v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 914 (1950).
89. Harbin v. Assurance Co. of America, 308 F.2d 748, 749 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1962).
90. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 117 F.2d 793, 800 (4th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, Beverage v. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 914 (1950).
91. Perhaps, to offset this, the insurer should be liable to the insured for the costs
of defending where judgment in the tort action is entered on a set of facts within the
policy coverage. However, such a rule may encourage collusion between an insured and
an injured party which, of course, is an undesirable result.
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is sound. When a declaratory judgment action between an insurer and
its insured is sought to determine the insurer's duty to defend, the court
should look in the first instance only to the terms of the policy and the
allegations of the tort complaint. If the allegations indicate that the claim
is not within the policy coverage, the insurer should not be required to
defend." However, if they indicate that the claim is within the policy
coverage, the court should then look to the insurer's grounds93 for con-
tending that it should not be required to defend.
If the issues upon which the insurer relies are separable from the
issues which will determine the insured's tort liability, then the former
should be adjudicated in the declaratory judgment action. Where it is
found that the insurer is not under a duty to defend, the court will neces-
sarily be determining that the insurer is not ultimately liable under the
policy even if the insured is, in the tort suit, adjudged liable to the injured
party, for example, where the insured has failed to cooperate with the
insurer as required under the policy. On the other hand, a finding that
the insurer is under a duty to defend94 will not be dispositive of the
insurer's duty to indemnify the insured because the insured may sub-
sequently breach one of the policy conditions or judgment may be entered
against the insured in the tort action on a set of facts outside the policy
coverage.
If the issues upon which the insurer relies are not separable from the
issues which will determine the insured's liability in the tort suit, the court
must look to see if there is a conflict of interest. The test for a conflict of
interests should be that enunciated in Hamner, that is, the insurer should
not be required to defend the insured where a showing by the insurer
that it is not ultimately liable under the policy will not necessarily result
in a judgment in favor of the insured. If a conflict of interests exists,
the insurer should not be required to defend and the court should enter
a judgment to that effect. However, the issues which will determine
the insured's liability in the tort suit (and will collaterally determine the
insurer's ultimate liability to indemnify the insured) should not be de-
cided in the declaratory judgment action, but should be left to adjudica-
tion in the tort action between the injured party and the insured.
92. The court may also decide that the insurer is not ultimately liable under the
policy, but such a determination should go only to the facts alleged in the tort complaint
and not be binding in the event that judgment is entered against the insured in the tort
action on a set of facts within the policy coverage.
93. I.e., grounds other than the failure of the tort complaint to bring the claim
within the policy coverage.
94. E.g., where the insurer is held to have waived the defense on which it relies.
